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THE “MAJESTIC EQUALITY” OF THE LAW: 
  WHY CONSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES DO NOT PRODUCE EQUALITY 
 
Harry Arthurs1 
  
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to 
sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread. 
Anatole France,  Le lys rouge (1894)   
Introduction 
Two epidemiological studies — the Whitehall Studies of 1967 and 1988  — famously 
demonstrated that socio-economic status is a primary determinant of health outcomes.  
(Marmot & Smith, 1997)  By locating a large cohort of British civil servants on a social-
class  gradient,  researchers were able to show  that individuals at successively lower 
levels on that  gradient experienced diminishing  prospects of good health  and 
longevity.  This conclusion was complemented by subsequent studies  that  concluded 
that  degrees of  inequality in a society — rather than absolute levels of wealth and 
status — are a very strong predictor of health outcomes. (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009) 
Finally, we  know from other studies that  women, young people, the disabled,  the 
unskilled and uneducated, members of racialized groups and recent immigrants tend to 
be over-represented in the lower ranges of the class gradient.  To the best of my 
knowledge, no single comprehensive  epidemiological  study has sought to  test 
empirically the  link  between economic or social  inequality, on the one hand,  and the 
overall quality of citizenship on the other.   However, there is  little reason to doubt that 
Anatole France’s mordant reflections on the relationship of law and equality would be 
confirmed by such a study.  We already know that  inequality correlates with diminished  
access to education, employment, housing and other social goods, with lower rates of 
participation in civic and cultural life, and with higher rates of  abusive treatment at the 
hands of  public  and  private bureaucracies.   It would hardly be surprising to learn that 
it also correlates closely with the denigration or denial of legal and political rights.     
1  University Professor Emeritus and President Emeritus, York University, Toronto, Canada.  
harthurs@osgoode.yorku.ca   This paper was originally presented at a workshop on Equality, at the 
Institute for Advanced Studies,  Nantes, France, in June, 2014. 
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Finally,  recent research suggests that advanced economies are  becoming more 
unequal for a variety of reasons, including the growing importance of inherited  wealth 
and the dominance of  the “grabbing hand” model of corporate governance,  which 
enables those who control the distribution of profits  to claim disproportionate shares for 
themselves.  (Picketty 2014)  If this is true, if the gradient I have described is becoming 
steeper and steeper, we can expect that the distribution of social goods is becoming 
less and less fair; that the vulnerable populations mentioned above are likely to 
experience greater and greater  deprivation and exclusion; and that the gap between 
law’s promise and its performance is likely to grow at an alarming rate.   
What should we do about inequality?     
Some believe that nothing can or should be done.  Inequality (they maintain) is divinely 
ordained or the result of bad luck; it stems from the  different  natural endowments of 
individuals or racialized and gendered groups; or it is a punishment for sin and sloth.  
On the other hand,  some view inequality as a positive good.   The desire to earn more 
or the fear of earning less motivates individuals to make rational decisions that in turn 
produce efficient market outcomes which, in the long run, are in the interests of 
everyone.  By contrast (they argue)  measures to constrain or correct inequality — 
progressive taxation, social transfers, minimum wages —  impose “job-killing”  burdens 
on market economies, discourage entrepreneurship,  dampen productivity and cause 
capital flight.    
Those who favour positive action to reduce inequality similarly do so for a variety of 
reasons.    Some believe that greater equality will produce  greater political stability, 
improve  economic performance or reduce crime and other social harms.  Others 
believe that  equality is a moral  imperative in itself, an indispensable condition for the 
achievement of true democracy and the full realization of human capacities.  Still others 
believe, more modestly, that equality rests on a logical presumption that needs no 
normative defence.    Moreover, within the egalitarian camp, opinions differ on how best 
to flatten the gradient I have described so as to achieve greater social inclusion.   Some 
(though not very plausibly) favour revolution; others argue that change must be  the 
product of  long-term political, social and cultural mobilization; still others believe that 
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constitutional entrenchment of social and economic equality rights offers  the easiest, 
fastest and surest route to  a just society.    Much as I admire their motives and support 
their aims,  I believe that advocates of  this  last  position  are mistaken.   In this essay, I 
will offer a brief history of  failed projects  in constitutional egalitarianism, explain why 
they are unlikely to succeed in the future, and describe how such projects have 
sometimes, albeit unintentionally, produced  outcomes that inhibit rather than advance 
the cause of equality.   However, I will conclude by acknowledging that law can indeed 
contribute  modestly to the cause of equality.   
Constitutional egalitarianism in the 20th century: A  short history  
In  Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century, Michael Mazower points out that in the 
aftermath of the Great War, many European countries adopted new constitutions that 
proclaimed principles of democracy and equality and contained state-of-the-art  
protections for social, labour and other egalitarian rights.  But by 1940, he reminds us, 
all of  those constitutions and their egalitarian projects had been abandoned in the face 
of economic or political crises, outbreaks of nationalism or xenophobia,  revolutions or 
wars.  (Mazower 1998) By contrast, the basic laws  adopted after 1945  by many  
European capitalist democracies and in the Anglosphere largely remain  in force today. 
However, their longevity has exposed  a certain contradiction in their architecture and 
operation.  (A different  narrative prevails in the global south, and in the former people’s 
republics.) 
On the one hand, most post-1945 constitutions promised  equal rights for  men and 
women, for  people of all races and religions, and in due  course  for  previously 
stigmatized groups and individuals.  (Law & Versteeg 2011)  Imperfectly and  subject to   
significant caveats, those constitutional promises have come to be honoured most of 
the time in most of those countries with regard to  most legal relations amongst citizens 
and with the state.  In general, men and women enjoy more nearly equal legal rights 
than they used to;  religious and racial minorities less often suffer formal discrimination 
at the hands of the state;  members of  historically dis-favoured groups —  homosexuals 
and the disabled, for example — enjoy somewhat increased legal protection and 
support.  And finally, postwar constitutional egalitarianism at the  national  level  has  
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been buttressed  by the  intellectual inspiration, the normative legitimacy, and  (to a 
lesser extent) the juridical effect of transnational legal regimes and discursive 
networks.2 
These are not inconsiderable achievements, but they do not themselves speak directly 
to the irony that Anatole France identified.  By contrast,  for  some three decades after 
1945  most capitalist democracies also pursued practical  strategies to reduce economic 
and social inequality.  These strategies — sometimes mandated by constitutional 
language, sometimes not — bear a variety of names:  the postwar or Fordist 
compromise, welfare capitalism,  social democracy, corporatism or coordinated market 
economies.  But they had a good deal in common.  Almost everywhere they included 
progressive taxation, the generous provision of social goods in cash or kind,  the 
promotion of full employment,  the aggregation of countervailing power in trade unions, 
credit unions or cooperatives and a degree of market  regulation or state ownership 
designed to prevent undue concentrations or abuses of power.(Judt 2005)   
These egalitarian strategies were highly successful in reducing inequality or mitigating 
its effects. However, by the 1980s, the ascendant forces of neo-liberalism had 
successfully dismissed them on the grounds that they supposedly impeded  economic 
progress,  imposed unacceptable and unsustainable burdens  of taxation,  interfered 
with individual freedom and —a telling, if hypocritical, criticism — failed in their 
meliorative ambitions and ultimately injured those they were meant to assist.  As  
postwar egalitarian strategies fell into  disrepute and disarray in many countries,  social 
and economic inequality began to rise again (especially in the Anglosphere)  returning 
ultimately to levels not seen for most of the 20th century.   This dramatic reversal  could 
hardly  have been achieved  by stealth; nor was it.   Rather, it was  explicitly advocated 
on the premise that “a rising tide lifts all boats”, that allowing the rich to get richer will 
result in benefits for all — more and  better jobs, a larger tax base and reduced tax 
rates, even  increased   support for necessary  public expenditures.3   What matters, 
2  See for example Global Constitutionalism — a scholarly journal devoted to the examination of 
“human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (published by Cambridge University Press). 
3   Ironically, the phrase seems to have been first used by President John F Kennedy, to justify the 
stimulus effect of a public works project.   However, latterly it has become associated with Milton 
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neo-liberals argued, is not inequality per se but the absolute standard of living enjoyed 
by ordinary citizens which (they claimed) would  rise as the economy flourishes.     
Alas, that is  not quite how things have turned out.   The deregulation of markets, 
cutbacks in the welfare state, reduction in the taxes paid by the wealthy and by 
corporations, the dismantling of  centres of countervailing power and other neo-liberal 
policies have indeed (as intended) allowed the rich to get much richer.  However while 
the situation differs from country to country, these measures have not only greatly 
increased economic and social inequality; in many countries they have left large 
segments of the population worse off in absolute terms than they were 30 or 40 years 
ago. (Atkinson & Morelli  2014)  Young people coming onto the labour market  face 
bleaker prospects than their predecessors;  pensions promised to many retired workers 
and prospective retirees will be paid only in part or not at all;  many working class and 
middle class families that sunk their  savings into home ownership have lost them 
altogether, or are at risk of doing so;  local businesses that once functioned as  engines 
of economic growth and social mobility are facing ruin;  essential elements of 
infrastructure — from universities to  social housing to public transport — survive on 
short rations; and the  unemployed and unemployable receive much less help from the 
state than they used to.   In short, the “bottom 90%” — those most dependent on state-
sponsored egalitarian policies — have borne  the brunt of the neo-liberal revolution, 
rather than the “top 10%”; and the gap between them is growing.  In consequence, 
some argue, the vastly unequal distribution of  political power and influence in some 
countries threatens the very foundations  of democratic governance.  A rising tide, it 
seems, may lift a few boats; but it is likely to swamp many  more.  
Of course,  the return of inequality cannot be  solely attributed to the ideological triumph 
of neo-liberalism after 1980.  Some contend that the postwar years of steady egalitarian 
advances were but temporary deviations from capitalism’s normal tendency to  extreme 
instability (Streek 2011)  and  inequality (Picketty 2014).  Other observers identify long-
term trends that have contributed to the return of inequality.   Technology  has erased 
Friedman and other supply-side  and neo-liberal  economists to justify policies that allow the rich to 
accumulate wealth,  whose beneficial effects will then “trickle down” in the form of investments, jobs and  
consumer expenditures.    
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many of the well-paid, secure industrial jobs  that underpinned the welfare state (Stone 
& Arthurs 2013, Appendix);  working class culture and consciousness have dissipated 
and with them  labour’s leverage in  industrial and political struggles (Arthurs 2011); and 
the collateral damage wrought by some failed experiments in social engineering  has 
alienated  former supporters and potential beneficiaries of the welfare state.  
Globalization, of course, has played its part too: it  has  reduced the  willingness of most 
states to remedy inequality for fear of harming their competitive position and/or credit 
rating.  Moreover, to be fair, it has also reduced  their capacity to do so by providing  
capital with an “exit” option that enables corporations,  in effect, to conduct a political 
strike against policies they deem undesirable.  And finally, the global financial crisis of 
2008 has enabled neo-liberalism to re-brand itself as “austerity”, as a set of 
extraordinary measures reversing the egalitarian tendencies of the welfare state not 
(ostensibly)  out of  ideological conviction but in response to force majeure.   
Thus we come to the  question  that  animates this essay:  After 1945, in most 
advanced capitalist democracies,  the “majestic equality” of the law was  not only 
proclaimed by their constitutions but apparently, for a time,  translated into policies that 
improved the lives of their citizens.  Fewer people actually had to sleep under bridges, 
beg in the streets or steal bread.   However, in recent decades,  economic and social 
inequality have grown apace and become more entrenched, with especially deleterious  
consequences for  vulnerable populations in the lower reaches of the socio-economic 
gradient.  Growing inequality, however, has coincided not with a retrenchment in legal 
guarantees but oddly — in  some countries — with their apparent expansion.   Respect 
for the  “rule of law” was declared  by neo-liberals to be  indispensable to the health of 
national and global economies (Garth & Dezalay 2002);   new bills of rights were 
adopted in Canada, the United Kingdom and South Africa;  legislation extended the 
rights of  marginalized groups in many countries; numerous dictatorships in the global 
south were replaced by rights-respecting democracies; and  “social inclusion” became a 
staple of political discourse across Europe. But significant numbers of  people — 
sometimes even more — still slept  under bridges, begged in the streets and stole 
bread.   
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In short, there appears to be little correlation between actual-existing social and 
economic equality and the legal rights and rhetoric that supposedly proclaim and 
entrench it.   In the next section of this essay, I will attempt to explain  why this might be 
so. 
Why constitutions often fail to achieve equality and sometimes reinforce  it 
 
My “short  history” of constitutional egalitarianism can be read as suggesting that law 
operates in relative isolation from society and the economy, that the social 
consequences of law are marginal at best, that there is no point in attempting the 
mobilization of the legal system  in order to advance egalitarianism (and by inference, 
that law is neither a primary source nor an effective bulwark of inequality).   Not quite:  
law does something; but there is often an observable gap between what law promises 
and what it delivers.(Nelken 1981, Gould & Barclay 2012) Thus, fundamental changes in 
social relations  are more often ratified by law than initiated by it;  the principles of law 
are often trumped by systemic malfunctions; and even apparently clear instances of 
equality-seeking groups and individuals successfully invoking law turn out, upon closer 
examination, to have resulted in quite different outcomes. (Rosenberg 2008)    All of 
these are well-known problems for those who seek to remedy inequality by recourse to 
law.   But I want to make several yet more fundamental points. 
 
First, law not only empowers equality-seeking groups; it sometimes disempowers them 
as well.   By offering them the prospect, the hope, of achieving their goals without the 
psychic and material costs of mobilization and struggle, legal recourse tempts them to 
abandon struggle or the threat of struggle.  In part this is for technical and tactical 
reasons: courts may deny equality-seekers the legal remedies they would otherwise be 
entitled to if they are themselves in breach of the law.   In  part, however, it is a matter of  
self-perception: equality-seekers who go to law do so because they think of themselves 
as  members of  a community with justiciable claims to  social justice.  By contrast, 
equality-seekers who mobilize for political, social or economic action are almost by 
definition more alienated from the system,  more prepared to challenge it from the 
outside, less willing to accept the premises on which the system  itself is constructed.  
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And finally, it has often been observed that law mystifies and obfuscates.  It makes 
appear as normal what ought to be seen as outrageous; it confers an appearance  of 
invincible logic and indisputable  virtue on what are at bottom arbitrary value choices.   It 
is difficult to persuade people to mobilize against what is “normal”, logical and virtuous. 
(Kennedy 1997)   Much the same could be said about economics.  
 
Second, almost by definition law — especially constitutional law— legitimates the 
existing order and the social outcomes produced by that order.  This is so even if the 
legal text makes no mention of inequality-generating aspects of that order or mentions 
them only in an elliptical or allusive fashion.  The  primacy of markets as  the pre-
eminent instrument of social ordering, for example, is  seldom mentioned —much less 
guaranteed — by legal or constitutional texts.  But if  a constitution mandates state 
regulation of markets in designated economic domains, it is likely to be read as 
inferentially excluding regulation in others.   And by not mentioning markets at all, by 
treating them as background facts like mountains or monsoons,  constitutions are likely 
to be read as limiting the power of states to replace  them with some other form of social 
ordering.  Likely, but not inevitably: of course courts and commentators can find clues in 
legal texts that support egalitarian,  market-mitigating  initiatives by the state — if they 
want to.  But they seldom want to:  many judges  and  academics are heavily invested in 
the status quo, and most of those who are more change-minded are sensitive to their 
limited mandate to bring about social transformation and to the practical difficulties of 
doing so by judicial decree.  Let me cite Canada’s experience as an example.  Its  
constitution protects the  equality rights of a number of groups.  By judicial 
interpretation, those rights have been extended to  “analogous groups” such as gays 
and lesbians.4  But no court has yet held that the poor are “analogous” and should be 
treated as equal to the rich as regards their access to food, shelter or  education.  On 
the contrary, Canadian  courts have held that denying  sick  people the opportunity  to 
purchase privately medical services that the state system cannot provide in timely 
fashion violates the  “security of [their] person”5 — a clear preference for rich patients 
4   Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 Supreme Court Reports 493 
5   Chaoulli v Québec  [2005] 1 Supreme Court Reports 791 
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over poor ones.   Alas,  no court has yet ruled that “security of the person” entitles 
everyone to gainful employment in the public or private sector (or  generous social 
assistance in lieu) in order to keep their “person” alive and healthy.       
 
This brings me to a third difficulty: the architecture of constitutions often inhibits 
egalitarian initiatives without meaning to do so.  Federalism represents an example of 
such a constraint.  Assuming that a government is determined to end social exclusion or 
even modestly redistribute wealth and life chances in favour of marginalized 
communities, it must have the constitutional power to do so.  But powers in a federation 
are by definition divided amongst different levels of government.  It is therefore 
extremely unlikely that any one level would possess all the powers needed to revise the 
terms of the social contract, whether through taxation, social programs,  public 
ownership or the formation of  alternative aggregations of economic power.  Or to take 
another example, most constitutional democracies separate legislative, judicial and 
executive power.   Initiatives to enhance equality by, say, altering labour market 
outcomes will  almost certainly require action by executive agencies.  However, to be 
effective such agencies may have to  exercise  powers that currently reside with the 
judiciary, a development that might well be found unconstitutional.6  A final example:  
the global economy.  Whether globalization and regional economic integration represent 
an inadvertent constraint on egalitarian policies, or a deliberate strategy to frustrate 
them, is a moot point.   However, it is certainly true that there is asymmetry between the  
constitutional development of trade-related regimes and those that seek to advance 
social aims such as greater equality.   In general the former are better developed than 
the latter.  Thus, the WTO and the IMF have more extensive legal powers and practical  
means to shape the lives of citizens of  member states than the ILO or the WHO;  the 
development of “social Europe” has notoriously lagged that of the European common 
market;  and while trade amongst the NAFTA partners flourishes, their labour side-
agreement is virtually a dead letter.     
6  Schechter Poultry v United States 295 US 475 (1935) 
                                            
10 
 
A final difficulty:  the inhibiting effect of constitutions on egalitarian policies is not always 
inadvertent.   One example is the relative autonomy of central banks in setting  
monetary policy, ostensibly so  that their crucial interventions in the economy will  rest 
on  technocratic, not political, considerations.  But  secreted in the very idea of  bank-led 
monetary policy is a series of anti-egalitarian assumptions  — that voters will favour full 
employment, that full employment leads to increased wages,  increased wages   to 
inflation,  inflation  to  capital flight and  capital flight to economic disaster.  Hence the 
use of interest rates to “cool out” the labour market — to frustrate attempts by workers 
to gain a larger share of national wealth.   Another example: constitutional provisions 
have been proposed or adopted in many countries to constrain the ability of  
governments to adopt  budget deficits or increase taxes.  Their obvious purpose is to 
shrink the state’s capacity to support a generous welfare system.   And yet another 
example: fundamental laws that protect property and contractual rights were once used 
(and could be again) to  strike down minimum wage and maximum hours statutes and 
other protective legislation.7   Ironically, France’s  Conseil Constitutionnel  has held that 
the constitutional  guarantees of  “equality in relation to public charges” protected the 
rich from the imposition of a “confiscatory” tax that  would have relieved some of the 
pressures on the poor8 (though a revised version of the tax was later accepted as 
constitutionally valid).9  And   the US Supreme Court has ruled that rich citizens no less 
than poor ones, powerful corporations no less than community groups,  may  spend 
unlimited sums  in exercising their right of free speech in the political process.10      
Why do the wealthy and the powerful appear to benefit more often from  constitutional 
protections  than the poor and victims of social exclusion?  The answer — I contend — 
is that the real constitution, the operative constitution, of most countries is not the legal 
document that bears that name.  It is rather the normative assumptions inscribed in the  
7  Lochner v New York  198 US 45 (1905)  
8  Decision on the Law of Finances for 2013, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/english/case-law/sample-of-decisions-in-relevant-areas-dc/decision/decision-no-2012-662-
dc-of-29-december-2012.135747.html   2014.142240.html 
9  Decision on the Supplementary Law on Finances for 2014, http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/case-law/sample-of-decisions-in-relevant-areas-
dc/decision/decision-no-2014-699-dc-of-6-august-2014.142240.html 
10  Citizens United v Federal Election Commission 558 US 310 (2010); McCutcheon v Federal 
Election Commission 572 US – (2014) 
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deep structures of the economy,  which in turn establish the social and economic 
gradient  along which the life chances of citizens are distributed. (Arthurs 2007)  Those 
structures, that gradient, are seldom sanctioned by express language in the formal, 
legal constitution,  but they are more powerful than any of its provisions.  One therefore 
comes reluctantly to the conclusion that the only way to mitigate  inequality is to revise 
the real constitution.     Such an approach is known by the name of “politics”.   
The politics of inequality  
A basic assumption of democratic politics is that people should have the right to choose 
their own government and, by doing so, choose also the policies that will govern their 
lives.   Inherent in this assumption is the possibility that the majority will  favour policies 
that disfavour the interests of the minority and, more specifically, that the interests of the 
poor will prevail over those of the rich.  Consequently, some early constitutions 
contained  anti-majoritarian, hence anti-egalitarian, provisions:  a property-based 
electoral franchise,  guarantees against “arbitrary” deprivation of property rights,  
legislative  chambers dominated by wealthy conservative elites as a bulwark against 
democratic excess.  But as the force of such provisions gradually dissipated — formal 
constitutions, remember, are less powerful than is commonly supposed — the rich  
turned to politics.     
Unlike the formal constitution, the “real constitution” gives the rich a significant political 
advantage. To ensure that their point of view is not only heard, but that it dominates 
public policy discussions, wealthy individuals and corporations endow professorships 
and think-tanks,  purchase mass media and sponsor publications, finance conferences 
and  disseminate propaganda.  Most alarmingly, in some countries they are free  to buy 
as much political influence  as they care to afford — to tilt the outcome of  referenda or 
election campaigns,  to secure the favourable exercise of executive discretion in the 
adoption of policies and the drafting of regulations, to win regulatory litigation  by hiring 
the best lawyers to attenuate proceedings to the point where rights-seekers are forced 
to abandon them,  and to secure government contracts, monopolies and subsidies.   
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But the politics of wealth are not always so crude.   Sometimes  wealth operates by 
managing the vernacular of political discourse.  For example,  economists  who  believe 
in the primacy of markets (which is to say most of them) talk about “efficiency” rather 
than equality;  philosophers who espouse free enterprise stress “individual freedom” 
over  social justice;  and political scientists talk about “new public management” rather 
than de-regulation.   Sometimes, too, the politics of wealth converge with the politics of 
resentment.  For example, workers who have lost their jobs in the Great Recession, or 
fear doing so, are urged to vent their frustration on those who are “different”, rather than  
those  who are rich;  workers  who are lucky enough to retain their jobs  are urged to 
think of  themselves as members of an amorphous “home owning” “hard working” 
“middle class” rather than as  members or potential members of the precariat.    This 
convergence has contributed to the shift of support from socialist and social democratic 
movements  to  right wing populist and nativist movements (some of which, ironically, 
describe themselves as anti-capitalist).   
Nor, for several reasons, should those concerned about  growing inequality within the 
developed capitalist democracies place too much hope in the political revival of the 
traditional left.   The rich, and the  parties of the right that they favour,  do not win 
elections because they are able to persuade the non-rich to vote for inequality.  They  
win because they appeal to the many ordinary citizens who genuinely place a higher 
value  on national or regional identity, race or religion, cultural preferences or social 
status, than they do on class loyalty or even economic self-interest.   Moreover, the rich 
and the right are aided unintentionally by parties  of the left that, when in office, 
abandon their egalitarian programs under duress, as a result of incompetence or for 
opportunistic reasons.   But most importantly, those who hope for the return of the 
traditional left must contend with the likelihood that politics will less and less be 
conducted through the familiar structures of parties, parliaments, policies and programs.   
The rise during the recent financial crisis of “defiant publics” (Drache 2008) — of 
spontaneous protest movements and fringe parties of the right and left —testifies to the 
possibility that  politics may never be the same again.     
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Perhaps the best  equality seekers can hope for is that capitalism will somehow reform 
itself, will somehow abandon its unlimited tolerance for inequality and the  
consequences of inequality.  Optimists believe that this attitudinal change can be 
achieved by  demonstrating that the full engagement of human capacities, and the just 
distribution of life chances that would make such engagement possible,  will make 
capitalism more successful.   Perhaps in the long run, this concept will become 
embedded in the deep structures of “the real constitution”.  In the short run, however,  I 
think this is highly unlikely.   Rather I believe that, as it did in  the 1930s, capitalism will 
develop an appetite for change because  of a well-justified fear that the system itself is 
at risk of collapse.   How to foster that fear?  Traditional political activity may help: the 
risk of losing power at the next election wonderfully concentrates the mind, even of 
governments beholden to rich supporters and ideologically comfortable with inequality.  
Popular  mobilization may help:  markets, after all, depend on a degree of public order 
and public order is difficult to maintain if the  citizenry is impoverished and aroused.   
Advances in economic theory will help: we need a Keynes for our time, a  respected  
figure from the innermost circles of reputable opinion with the courage to reveal  
capitalism’s fundamental flaws, the credibility to have those revelations taken seriously 
and the creativity to propose plausible improvements.   
And what of law? 
Conclusion 
To disregard France’s critique of law would be unforgivable.   But to  imagine that  that 
critique justifies dismissal of law’s potential contribution to alleviating  the consequences 
of inequality would be foolish.   I have tried to show why  we should not over-estimate 
that potential, and why  we should not assign  judges to  do the heavy lifting of social 
transformation.   But there is a role for law and  good reasons to favour  the rule of law. 
The first is that those in the lower reaches of the social gradient — in addition to their 
other travails — are also the prime  victims of quotidian abuse by public authorities (the 
police and welfare agencies) and private bureaucracies (banks and landlords).  The rule 
of law can  do much to protect them from such abuse, even if it cannot protect them 
14 
 
from the most egregious consequences of inequality.    The second is that if, for the 
foreseeable future, the best prospects for  reforming  capitalism involve creating a 
sense of fear about  its future,  then it is essential that optimal conditions should exist for  
such activity.   If we ensure respect for freedom of association, belief and expression — 
core principles of the rule of law — we create a safe space within which critics and 
protesters can do their work.   The third is that we want future governments and 
business leaders with a greater commitment  to social justice to come to office  with a 
clean conscience and a commitment to legality.   By insisting on their own rights, they 
will hopefully internalize the need to respect the rights of others. 
EP Thompson, the Marxian social historian, memorably (and controversially) reminded 
us that “the rule of law is an unqualified human good”.  (Thompson 1975 at 266)  To 
acknowledge its limits, to accept that it is incapable of  revising the “real constitution” 
that is the source of inequality and injustice, is not to deny its practical value.    
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